Research
My research is motivated by an interest in American political institutions, congressional elections, representation, and quantitative methods. More specifically, I study how institutional factors shape the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, and how institutional and electoral forces shape congressional elections from the perspective of both candidates and voters. I provide links to my published and ongoing research below.
Congress, Elections, Parties, and Representation
Abstract
Since the 1990s, U.S. elections have become increasingly nationalized, linking down-ballot contests more closely to presidential politics and national party forces. We examine how this shift has affected competition in U.S. House general elections from 1946 to 2022. Using three measures of nationalization, we evaluate its effects on challenger strategic behavior, experienced challenger emergence, and overall challenger success. Our findings show that nationalization reduces both the likelihood that quality challengers enter House races and the probability that challengers succeed once they run. We also connect these dynamics to election administration by showing how primary rules, redistricting authority, and ballot design condition the competitive environment voters encounter. The results demonstrate that nationalization reshapes congressional competition while also highlighting the institutional foundations of electoral accountability, representation, and meaningful choice on the ballot in an era when local contests are increasingly filtered through national partisan conflict and presidential evaluations rather than local considerations.
Abstract
In the USA states, there is substantial institutional variation among executive branch administrative officials, with state executive branch offices varying by their selection method. Prior scholarship has devoted little attention to the policy implications of this institutional variation. In this article, we explore the consequences of this administrative characteristic by examining state attorneys general. We develop the theoretical rationale that during periods of high crime, for states with an elected attorney general, there should be an increase in the state’s incarceration rate. Conversely, for states with appointed attorneys general, increases in crime will have little effect on the state’s incarceration rate. When analyzing the incarceration rates among all USA states across a seventeen-year period, we find some evidence to support our theoretical expectation. These results highlight the implications that executive branch design has on public policy and governance in several ways.
Abstract
A vast body of work investigates the consequences of legislative term limits for public policy. However, considerably less research has delved into their effects in noneconomic policy domains. In this article, we develop the argument that implemented term limits increase the effect that a state government’s ideology has on the state’s incarceration rate. When analyzing incarceration rates among all states between 1979 and 2017, we find evidence to support our theoretical expectation. Specifically, for states with term limits, we find that an increase in state government conservatism is associated with a higher incarceration rate. Conversely, for non-term-limited states, we find that the policy preferences of the state government have little influence on the incarceration rate. These findings deepen our insight into how institutional design can affect public policy.
Abstract
Students of legislative politics are divided over the relationship between electoral vulnerability and the type of “home style” members of Congress adopt in terms of their district staffing decisions. The conventional wisdom asserts that an increase in electoral vulnerability corresponds with a legislator increasing the number of district staffers. However, another body of works implies that the inverse relationship should occur. To settle these competing claims, we explore the staffing decisions of legislators serving in the House of Representatives between the 101st and 113th Congress. We find that an increase in electoral vulnerability is associated with a decrease in district staffers. These results cast doubt on the widely held view that a legislator’s electoral vulnerability results in an increase in district attentiveness at least in terms of their district staff. Additionally, our findings provide several insights into the relationship between elections and representation.
Abstract
This essay highlights the challenges faced by the Trump Administration during the first 8 months of his presidency despite unified Republican control of both chambers of Congress. It begins by focusing briefly on the lead-up to the 2016 election before turning to the struggles the administration has faced in enacting policies since inauguration. The essay concludes with a look ahead at the 2018 midterm elections and the implications for the remainder of the Trump presidency.
Executive Politics and Separation of Powers
Abstract
In this study, we provide a first-of-its-kind exploration of how strategic messaging by U.S. Attorneys changes during a partisan transition. We leverage original data from United States Attorney’s Office press releases that are used to inform the public about important case developments, offering a window into federal prosecutorial priorities and narratives. Using textual analysis, we examine how these political communications changed in the turnover from the Biden administration to the second Trump administration. Then, we utilize criminal case processing data to evaluate whether the content of press releases tracks with U.S. Attorney charging decisions.
Abstract
This study examines whether the political appointment of federal judges influenced the sentencing of individuals charged in connection with the January 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection. Using a novel dataset covering the full population of nearly 1,500 defendants with charges filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, we leverage random case assignment procedures to better understand the sentences that were imposed for each defendant. Our findings indicate that there were no significant partisan differences in terms of the imposition of incarceration or sentence length by these district judges. However, when disaggregating by individual presidents we find that distinct patterns are evident. These findings highlight the nuanced and sometimes unexpected ways appointment effects manifest in politically sensitive cases. They also underscore the significance of district judges amid ongoing legal conflicts involving presidential power.
Abstract
Despite the combination of strong parties and insecure majorities in U.S. legislative institutions, Senate committees play a vital role in confirmation politics. A theory of selective committee delay is proposed that predicts that ideologically-vulnerable Senate committees constitute a primary source of confirmation delay. Evidence supporting this logic is obtained from nearly 10,000 U.S. federal PAS executive nominations between the Reagan and Trump administrations. Unified (divided) partisan alignment between the Senate and president is associated with protracted (swifter) committee confirmation processes when committees’ policy interests diverge from those of the presidents. These findings highlight how the confirmation process serves as both a decentralized and variable procedural constraint on the executive branch appointment process within a separation of powers framework. More broadly, presidential nominee selection choices must account for the relative ideological positions of Senate committees, and that chamber-oriented rule changes to the confirmation process are unlikely to affect confirmation delay.
Abstract
Previous research finds that grant spending can improve the standing of politicians and institutions with some in the public. It is unclear whether this effect holds for federal agencies as well, which are largely responsible for allocating these funds. We develop a theory that links agency grant spending to the likelihood of an individual supporting the awarding federal agency, with the expectation that this relationship is conditioned by the citizen’s partisan identification. Using a survey experiment, we find that an increase in federal grant spending, from agencies that they politically oppose, is associated with Republicans offering a more negative evaluation.
Abstract
Administrative leader turnover adversely affects the organizational stability of U.S. federal executive agencies, as well as undermines presidents’ policy goals. An incentive compatibility theory of administrative leader turnover is proposed that distinguishes between proponent (policy priority) versus caretaker (non-policy priority) loyalist executive appointees. This theory predicts that the proponents’ tenure will be comparatively more stable since it reflects incentive compatibility for both the president and executive appointee compared to caretakers where such a relationship is lacking. The evidence comports with this logic by demonstrating that appointee loyalty results in a longer tenure in office when their agency constitutes a stated policy priority for the president at the time of agreed upon service compared to when this happens not to be the case. Responsive competence in executive administration requires incentive compatibility that benefits both the president and executive appointees for ensuring stable leadership of U.S. federal agencies.
Abstract
Confirmation delay is decomposed to better understand both when and why the Senate augments its efforts to vet presidential nominees. Distinctions among expedited, normal, and protracted confirmation processes are analyzed, as well as those between the work of Senate standing committees and chamber floor. A theory of ex ante moral hazard reduction is proposed that predicts as the confirmation process becomes increasingly protracted in response to rising potential agency costs, the Senate will be increasingly swifter to confirm tier 1 top executive leaders to US federal agency leadership positions than tier 2 subordinate leadership nominees. The statistical evidence is consistent with this theory of differential vetting between nominee tiers for both Senate party polarization and the nominee’s loyalty to the appointing president, as well as for agency decision-making independence restricted to protracted confirmation processes. Yet, such differential vetting is not empirically observed in response to interbranch policy conflict.
Abstract
President Donald Trump has made various decisions, many controversial, to manage the coronavirus pandemic. The reaction to President Trump’s leadership has been met with a mixed response from the public. This raises an important question; what factors influence a citizen’s evaluation of President Trump’s response to the pandemic? We develop a theory that links a citizen knowing someone diagnosed with COVID-19 with their evaluation of President Trump’s management of the pandemic, with the expectation that this relationship is conditioned by a citizen’s ideology. Using data from two surveys, we find that knowing someone diagnosed with COVID-19 diminishes the effect ideology has on a citizen’s evaluation. Additionally, we find that a citizen’s evaluation of President Trump’s leadership on COVID-19 is associated with their vote choice in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Overall, this article contributes to our understanding of public opinion on COVID-19 and its political ramifications.
Abstract
Several political scientists argue that electorally vulnerable legislators should be more likely to cast, rather than skip, legislative roll call votes. However, most empirical studies find limited evidence to support this claim. In this article, we argue that electorally vulnerable members serving in the House of Representatives are more likely to engage in position taking, via casting a roll call vote rather than abstaining, on a certain subset of legislative votes. We suggest that roll call votes that the president has publicly addressed should be especially ripe for legislators to engage in position taking because of the executive branch’s unique influence on electoral politics for legislators. When examining all roll call votes in the 84th through the 112th Congress in the House of Representatives, we find that members who barely won their last election are associated with a higher attendance record on roll calls that the president has revealed his preferences on. We also find that electorally vulnerable members are less likely to abstain on roll call votes that pass or fail by a narrow margin. These findings shed light on legislative-executive relations.
Abstract
Politicians routinely campaign on a large platform of new policies and policy changes they hope to pursue once in office. Presidents, however, are unique in their ability to accomplish this given the multiple avenues by which they can enact policy change. Using each presidential agenda between 1964 and 2010, we evaluate the circumstances under which a president’s policy goal is realized via an executive order or a law passed by Congress. Previous studies have only considered these avenues independently, but when we consider them in concert with one another, new patterns emerge. Our results indicate that a president’s proposal is most commonly addressed in tandem with Congress through the traditional legislative process. However, the level of polarization, presidential approval, the composition of government, and the type of issue being addressed increase the probability of a proposal being addressed unilaterally via executive order rather than by passing a law.
Quantitative Methodology and Spatial Analysis
Abstract
Theoretical units of interest often do not align with the spatial units at which data are available. This problem is pervasive in political science, particularly in subnational empirical research that requires integrating data across incompatible geographic units (e.g., administrative areas, electoral constituencies, and grid cells). Overcoming this challenge requires researchers not only to align the scale of empirical and theoretical units, but also to understand the consequences of this change of support for measurement error and statistical inference. We show how the accuracy of transformed values and the estimation of regression coefficients depend on the degree of nesting (i.e., whether units fall completely and neatly inside each other) and on the relative scale of source and destination units (i.e., aggregation, disaggregation, and hybrid). We introduce simple, nonparametric measures of relative nesting and scale, as ex ante indicators of spatial transformation complexity and error susceptibility. Using election data and Monte Carlo simulations, we show that these measures are strongly predictive of transformation quality across multiple change-of-support methods. We propose several validation procedures and provide open-source software to make transformation options more accessible, customizable, and intuitive.
Abstract
Two important trends in applied statistics are an increased usage of geospatial models and an increased usage of big data. Naturally, there has been overlap as analysts utilize the techniques associated with each. With geospatial methods such as kriging, the computation required becomes intensive quickly, even with datasets that would not be considered huge in other contexts. In this work we describe a solution to the computational problem of estimating Bayesian kriging models with big data, Bootstrap Random Spatial Sampling (BRSS), and first provide an analytical argument that BRSS produces consistent estimates from the Bayesian spatial model. Second, with a medium-sized dataset on fracking in West Virginia, we show that bootstrap sample effects from a full-information Bayesian model are reduced with more bootstrap samples and more observations per sample as in standard bootstrapping. Third, we offer a realistic illustration of the method by analyzing campaign donors in California with a large geocoded dataset. With this solution, scholars will not be constrained in their ability to apply theoretically relevant geospatial Bayesian models when the size of the data produces computational intractability.
Open-source tools developed alongside the methodological work.
Abstract
Integrates spatially-misaligned GIS datasets across incompatible geographic units. Part of the Sub-National Geospatial Data Archive System.
Abstract
Estimates kriging models for geographical point-referenced data. Method is described in Gill (2020) doi:10.1177/1532440020930197.
A complete record, including work in progress and conference presentations, is available on my curriculum vitae.